3. Legislation concerning foreign relations need not satisfy the same judicial tests applied in delegation decisions involving domestic matters. 4. Those portions of Sutherland's opinion which go beyond the issue of delegation in foreign affairs are dicta. 2 5 The decision does not legitimate loosely controlled delegation in the domestic area even though such delegation is associated with the conduct of foreign relations; 26 it does not obviate the need for senatorial approval of agreements with foreign powers; 27 and it does not affect CongTess's power to declare war.
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5. Curtiss-Wright says nothing about who is to make foreign policy (as opposed to who is to execute it).29 In fact, Curtiss-Wright does not hold that looser standards are permissible in connection with delegation involving foreign affairs. 30 On several occasions the Court has rejected broad interpretations of the foreign relations power; it has nevertheless avoided directly attacking Curtiss-Wright. 31 If anything, the uses to which the opinion has been put confirm that "[o]ne fact should not be overlooked-that the ambiguities of the opinion do not rule it out as available precedent." 32 In view of the Court's continued use of the case and the ongoing debate over its meaning, it is important to take a close look at what Sutherland said and at the evidence he adduced in support of his position. REC. 1049 REC. (1941 . He implicitly corrected himself when he attributed (id. at 1605-06) the doctrine that "the term 'to declare war' necessarily connotes 'the plenary power to wage war'" to Justice Sutherland's opinion for the Court in United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931) , in which case, however, Sutherland was not carefull distinguishing between powers of the separate branches. 
I. Precedent versus Principle
Curtiss-Wright held that the Joint Resolution of May 28, 1934, 33 was not an unconstitutional delegation of congressional power to the President. To understand and assess Justice Sutherland's opinion, it must be viewed historically. At the outset one must remember that the Court had recently taken a very narrow view of the permissible scope of delegatory legislation.
In the Panama 3 4 and Schechter3 cases, the Court required that delegatory legislation specify the policy it was designed to effectuate, establish a standard to monitor subsequent executive action, and state those findings of fact the President was required to make before acting." On brief in Curtiss-Wright the government maintained that the Joint Resolution met these tests. 37 Considering the result in the lower court and the government's and defendants' arguments on appeal, the key issue was whether the Joint Resolution required a finding of fact. 8 On this point, the government contended:
The fact to be found by the President-whether prohibition of the sale of arms in this country may contribute to the reestablishment of peace in the Chaco-is not, as the defendants have contended, a vague matter of opinion merely, upon which only a guess might be made. On the contrary, it is an eminently practical question depending upon facts which were peculiarly available to the President .... The state of the war, which might vary widely and rapidly, the number and type of purchases in this country by each side, and the sales if no prohibition were imposed, which would depend upon the financial condition of the 33. Resolved . . .. That if the President finds that the prohibition of the sale of arms and munitions of war in the United States to those countries now engaged in armed conflict in the Chaco may contribute to the reestablishment of peace between those countries, and if after consultation with the governments of other American Republics and with their cooperation, as well as that of such other governments as he may deem necessary, he makes proclamation to that effect, it shall be unlawful to sell, except under such limitations and exceptions as the President prescribes, any arms or munitions of war in any place in the United States to the countries now engaged in that armed conflict, or to any person, company, or association acting in the interest of either country, until otherwise ordered by the President or by Congress.
Sec. 2. Whoever sells any arms or munitions of war in violation of section 1 shall, on conviction, be punished by a fine not exceeding $10,000 or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both. 48 Stat. 811 (1934 In consequence the NRA failed to meet one of the tests of valid delegation. The requirement in the Joint Resolution that the President find an embargo "may contribute" to the reestablishment of peace was no more precise. In addition, no hard and fast assessment could be made of those factors which the government claimed 4 1 would determine the effect of the embargo. A judgment based on them would have amounted to the forbidden statement of opinion. 42 Notwithstanding the view of a recent author, the Joint Resolution required the President to find more than "a necessary factual condition precedent." 43 And even if the Joint Resolution could be interpreted to require a finding, it failed to obligate the President to act once he had made the requisite finding. Contrary to the apparent requirement of Panama and Schechter 4 4 he retained absolute discretion to issue or not to issue a proclamation prohibiting arms shipments. 45 So but an opinion bottomed on that contention would have been shaky. Certainly a more solid foundation was available: The resolution did not have to meet the Panama-Schechter tests, for it fell into a category of legislation which was not governed by the tests. This category, using Sutherland's own language, consisted of legislation whose "whole aim .. is to affect a situation entirely external to the United States, and falling within the category of foreign affairs." 40 To establish and sanction such a category Sutherland might have followed the lead of the government on brief 4 7 and cited long-standing legislative and judicial precedent, but he rejected this simple course. Taking a more involved route, he began with the proposition that the discretion vested in the President was consistent with early American constitutional principles. It was in this context that Sutherland made his remarks about the inherent federal foreign relations power and the Executive's independent role in foreign affairs.-s Only then did he review the series of "acts or joint resolutions of Congress authorizing action by the President in respect of subjects affecting foreign relations, which either leave the exercise of the power to his unrestricted judgment or provide a standard far more general than that which has always been considered requisite with regard to domestic affairs. ' 4 These acts, 50 he said, comprised "an impressive array of legislation .... enacted by nearly every Congress from the beginning of our national existence to the present day, [which] must be given unusual weight in the process of reaching a correct determination of the problem."' 1 The relevant rule had been set forth in several cases. 02 As stated in Field v. Clark, "the practical construction of the Constitution, as given by so many acts of Congress, and embracing almost the entire period of our national existence, should not be overruled, unless upon a conviction that such legislation was clearly incompatible with the supreme law of the land." The principles which justify such legislation find overwhelming support in the unbroken legislative practice which has prevailed almost from the inception of the national government to the present day," id. at 322; "a legislative practice such as we have here . . . goes a long way in the direction of proving the presence of an unassailable ground for the constitutionality of the practice, to be found in the origin and history of the power involved, or in its nature, or in both combined. and not what the courts had ruled, remained for Sutherland "the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality." Even if judicial precedent had deserved great weight, it did not necessarily support the government: A majority which included Sutherland had recently put its own gloss on The Aurora, Field, and Hampton. In Panama the Court had found that delegatory legislation had been upheld in these cases not because it fell into a special category of foreign relations legislation, but because the delegation involved was limited, being purely conditional in The Aurora and Field and administrative in Hampton. 67 The Court did hint that delegation possessed greater validity when it conferred on the President "an authority which was cognate to the conduct by him of the foreign relations of the Government." 6 s The hint, however, is almost imperceptible. It was placed in a discussion of early legislative acts which, as the Court noted, "were not the subject of judicial decision" 6 " and were interim or short-term in duration. 70 There were other recent cases involving delegation in foreign affairs, 71 (1936) . Interestingly, the government overlooked a pregnant dictum of Sutherland's in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 295 (1936). There, in his opinion for the Court, he had argued that the federal government possessed "no inherent power in respect of the internal affairs of the states," but he had also observed: "The question in respect of the inherent power of that government as to the external affairs of the nation and in the field of international law is a wholly different matter which it is not necessary now to consider" (emphasis in original). Yet, while anticipating Sutherland's position in Curtiss-Wright later that year, this section of the Carter opinion was concerned with the issue of dual federalism and not with the delegation issue that the government argued in Curtiss.Wright. See id. at 289-97. The omission is thus understandable. See also note 81 infra.
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Finally, the opinion in Curtiss-Wright cannot be understood apart from Sutherland's own intellectual background. The ideas expounded in Curtiss-Wright about the foreign relations power, which the government only fleetingly and vaguely suggested on brief, 73 Both the book and article contended that the power of the federal government with respect to foreign relations was and always had been complete. Such power did not come from delegations by the states or from affirmative grants in the Constitution but derived from external sovereignty inherited by the federal government from Great Britain via the united colonies and the Confederation. In these writings Sutherland had been interested in refuting the doctrine that dual federalism (which he otherwise accepted) placed limitations on federal activity in the external realm. He did not devote much attention to the allocation of the general foreign relations power among the branches of the federal government. 7 He did claim, however, that extra-constitutional action in foreign affairs should not be equated with un-constitutional action. 7 8 In other words, without directly confronting the separation of powers issue involved in Curtiss-Wright, Sutherland developed the ideas he would put into service in strikingly similar language in his later opinion. 7 9 Thus, one source of Sutherland's com- he fact that the views Sutherland expressed in Curtiss-Wright were his own nevertheless does not relegate them to status of dicta. Aside from a personal commitment to these views, he had good reasons for his opening discussion of first principles regarding the foreign relations power. Although it came first in his presentation, the discussion of principles followed from his comments about legislative precedent, and was not logically superfluous. It offered a means of establishing what resort to either legislative or judicial precedent could not conclusively establish and what respect for consistency and tenable distinctions required if the Joint Resolution were to be upheld in the face of Panama and Schechter.
II. First Principles: Justice Sutherland's Argument and Evidence
Justice Sutherland's fundamental premise was that the external and internal powers of the federal government "are different, both in respect of their origin and their nature." Internally, the government was one of enumerated powers, with the Constitution designed "to carve from the general mass of legislative powers then possessed by the states such portions as it was thought desirable to vest in the federal government, leaving those not included in the enumeration still in the states." However, "since the states severally never possessed international powers, such powers could not have been carved from the mass of state powers but obviously were transmitted to the United States from some other source." These "international powers" or "powers of external sovereignty" devolved on the federal government from the Confederation government, which in turn acquired them from "the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the United States of America." The ultimate source was the British Crown, although its possession of the external sovereignty of the American colonies ceased prior to America's formal independence because "[e]ven before the Declaration [of Independence], the colonies were a unit in foreign affairs, acting through a common agency-namely the Continental Congress ...
." "Rulers come and go," wrote Sutherland; "governments end and 80. Levitan, supra note 79, at 476.
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forms of government change; but sovereignty survives. A political society cannot endure without a supreme will somewhere. Sovereignty is never held in suspense. When, therefore, the external sovereignty of Great Britain in respect of the colonies ceased it immediately passed to the Union." 81 To borrow a term from his earlier writings, 8 2 Sutherland sought to place the federal government's foreign relations power on an extra-constitutional footing.
After providing additional detail 3 Sutherland turned to Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution for "general confirmation of" his position.
8 4 Because Sutherland saw fit to rely upon Story, the views of Story are of particular concern in understanding CurtissWright. Story advanced three separate meanings of the term "sovereignty." "By 'sovereignty' in its largest sense," he wrote, "is meant, supreme, absolute, uncontrollable power, the jus summi imperii, the absolute right to govern . . . .A State which possesses this absolute power, without any dependence on any foreign power or state, is in this largest sense a sovereign state." 8 5 At the same time, Story noted, "the sovereignty of the government, organized within the state, may be of a very limited nature." 8 6 By this "sovereignty of the government," or sovereignty in "a far more limited sense," Story meant "such political powers, as in the actual organization of the particular state or nation are to be exclusively exercised by certain public function. Sutherland recognized that the united colonies, prior to independ. ence, exercised sovereignty in its limited sense-that is, they held certain powers of sovereignty, including some pertaining to external affairs. For Sutherland, though, another government was evidently the only possible source for these powers of sovereignty. So, since the states severally had never possessed powers of "external sovereignty," these powers must have come from Great Britain. In turn, the schemes by which the states vested only enumerated powers in the federal government-that is, de facto arrangements until 1781, the Articles of Confederation from 1781 to 1789, and the Constitution after 1789-had little effect on the allocation and limitation of external powers.
From Story's perspective, however, there is a flaw in Sutherland's argument. For Story, the true source of the powers of sovereignty, whether external or internal, was the sovereign in the largest or absolute sense of the term. In the United States "[t]he absolute sovereignty of the nation is in the people of the nation.. ."I'll The people were "the foundation, upon which the super-structure of the liberties and independence of the United States has been erected." 0 The only point at which Story came at all close to Sutherland's view of the transmission of sovereignty was in a passage he quoted from Chisholm v. Georgia: "From the crown of Great Britain the sovereignty of their country [that is, the United States] passed to the people of it . . .,,1
Yet this establishes the people as the possessors of absolute sovereignty and as the source of governmental power. 92 Finally, the sovereignty of the United States "in reference to foreign states"-that is, in Story's third sense-also had its source in an act of the people. "The people of the united colonies," wrote Story, "made the united colonies free and independent states, and absolved them from all allegiance to the British Crown." ' 9 3 It is difficult to interpret Story as claiming that the Continental Congress held powers of "external sovereignty" by virtue of the sovereign status of the United States "in reference to foreign states." Instead, the reverse was true: The existence of powers of sovereignty, based on the consent of the absolute sovereign, gave rise to the sovereignty of the United States "in reference to foreign states." Story specifically linked Congress's authority in the external realm to the approval of people. solute sovereignty could reside with the people, with different governments within the same nation simultaneously possessing different powers of sovereignty. 99 Prior to the late 1780's few Americans accepted the popular sovereignty position, however implicit it may have been in the events and documents of independence.' 00 Most of those who paid attention to political issues would have denied that from the beginning of the Revolution the people of the United States (or of the united colonies) were the constitutive body with respect to the emerging central government. They would have agreed that absolute sovereignty is indivisible, and, like William Blackstone, they would have assigned it to a particular legislative body and not to the people at large. An implication of this early position was that absolute sovereignty must rest with either the central government or the state governments, but could not rest with both.' 0 '
In 1776 and 1777 Congress debated the proper allocation of sovereignty;
102 the outcome is readily apparent. The second article of the draft plan of union first considered by Congress provided that each colony "reserves to itself the sole and exclusive Regulation and Government of its internal police in all matters that shall not interfere with the Articles of Confederation."' 0 ' 3 The plan finally approved by Congress and eventually ratified by the states contained a rather different clause: "Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence and every power, jurisdiction, and right which is not by the confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled."' 1 4 This provision of the Articles, unlike the original draft, did not distinguish between powers of "internal police" and other powers. Vol. 83: 1, 1973 make war, peace, and treaties were a part of the "perfect though limited sovereignty" which "the thirteen independent sovereign states" had vested in Congress "by express delegation of power."' 10 Congress subsequently approved resolutions embodying Jay's view. 100 As Jay's report exemplifies, contemporary comments on the issue of sovereignty were often imprecise and sometimes contradictory; formulation of a new concept of sovereignty in America was slow and unsystematic.' 0 7 The crucial point is that both the earlier state sovereignty position and the emerging popular sovereignty position, which was arguably manifested in the Constitution,' 0 " are at odds with Sutherland's views.' 00 Each attributes to the central government only those powers delegated by the possessors of absolute sovereignty; neither admits of extra-constitutional powers.
Sutherland nevertheless adduced some specific evidence for his position. He claimed the Treaty of 1783 between Great Britain and the "United States of America" was a "practical application of [the] fact" that external sovereignty passed immediately from Britain to the American Union." 0 However, the Articles of Confederation, which went into effect in 1781, had expressly granted to Congress the treatymaking power."'
The Constitution, said Sutherland, "was ordained and established *.. to form 'a more perfect Union' " in circumstances where the existing government already "was the sole possessor of external sovereignty." Such sovereignty remained "in the Union . . . without change except in so far as the Constitution in express terms qualified The implication regarding the source of the new government's external powers is as clear as it is misleading. In fact, the Constitution, like the Articles, mentions important aspects of the foreign relations power. 113 Thus it is more accurate to say that the power is vested in the federal government because it is explicitly and implicitly granted by the Constitution and that it ultimately derives not from Britain but from whatever body legally ordained and established the Constitution.
Sutherland's contention that the Constitutional Convention "was called and exerted its powers upon the irrefutable postulate that though the states were several their people in respect of foreign affairs were one' . 4 is roughly accurate but is irrelevant to his theory. If anything, the implication that the people of the United States were the source of the foreign relations power detracts from his position. To be more accurate Sutherland might have said that the Convention was called because it was felt that the United States should be one with respect to foreign affairs (and certain other affairs), but that they could easily become several, and that they were most definitely having a difficult time maintaining themselves internationally as a nation." 
It would seem that Sutherland found firmer support for his position in a statement he quoted from Rufus King, made during the Constitutional Convention:
The States were not "sovereigns" in the sense contended for by some. They did not possess the peculiar features of sovereignty. They could not make war, nor peace, nor alliances, nor treaties. Considering them as political Beings, they were dumb, for they could not speak to any foreign Sovereign whatever. They were deaf, for they could not hear any propositions from such Sovereign. They had not even the organs or facilities of defence or offence, for they could not of themselves raise troops, or equip vessels, for war. 118 An immediate problem with King's statement is a general one that arises when using the Convention's debates to interpret the Constitution. As Madison noted several years later, the state ratifying conventions and not the Philadelphia Convention gave the Constitution its legal "life and validity." 1 9 Moreover, whatever opinion in Philadelphia may have been, it is hardly conclusive in itself in determining how Americans of 1787-1788 generally interpreted the Constitution. Nor does it provide any authoritative guide to what Americans thought about the preceding decade of their history either in 1787-1788 or at the time. It may, of course, give insight into ideas and assumptions of the period, 20 which makes further examination of King's statement worthwhile.
When examined more closely, the King quotation provides scant support for Sutherland's theory, since like most of Sutherland's evidence it says nothing about whether the Confederation's power respecting foreign affairs was inherited, extra-constitutionally, from England or derived from a constitutional source. 12 In order of Sutherland's presentation, this was the first piece of evidence cited. I have postponed discussion of it to this point in order to preserve a rough chronological framework.
128. "These high acts of sovereignty were submitted to, acquiesced in, and approved of, by the people of America. In Congress were vested, because by Congress were exercised with the approbation of the people, the rights and powers of war and peace." 3 U.S. The remaining two members of the Court took no part in the decision; Chief Justice Jay was in England on the diplomatic mission which resulted in Jay's Treaty, and Justice Wilson disqualified himself because of an earlier involvement in the case. SMITH, While each Justice satisfied himself that the Continental Congress, even before ratification of the Articles of Confederation, had held sufficient authority to establish an appellate procedure in Revolutionary War Prize Cases, 131 none of them used arguments supportive of Sutherland's view.
Sutherland missed one piece of evidence from the original Constitution which could be interpreted to support his case. While ordinary legislation is the supreme law of the land if "made in Pursuance" of the Constitution, treaties become supreme law when made under the "Authority of the United States."' 132 In the state ratification debates several antifederalists attacked this arrangement. 133 The federalists paid little attention to the problem, concentrating instead on the broader issue of whether the treaty-making process, as specified in the Constitution, contained adequate safeguards for state and regional interests. 134 This fact may indicate that most federalists agreed treaties were extra-constitutional, or it may indicate that they did not regard the charge as credible enough to warrant refutation. 13 136. Nevertheless, some indication of an original understanding (in the sense of an opinion commanding majority support) that treaties were subject to a higher authority can be gleaned from the Judiciary Act of 1789, which recognized that state courts might rule against the validity of a treaty. See 1 Stat. 73, 85-87 ( § 25) (1789).
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In any event, based on the historical evidence outlined above, Sutherland affirmed:
It results that the investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality. He noted that the Constitution has no extra-territorial force "unless in respect of our own citizens," and thus "the operation of the nation in such territory must be governed by treaties, international understandings and compacts, and the principles of international law. . In passing, it should be noted that Professor Schwartz incorrectly concludes, at 135-36, that the wording "under the Authority of the United States" in the Supremacy Clause was included to give validity to preexisting treaties rather than to make treaties superior to the Constitution. On August 23, 1787, the Federal Convention approved the clause with wording which (among other things) provided that "all Treaties made under the authority of the U.S. shall be the supreme law .... " Two days later the clause "was reconsidered and after the words 'all treaties made' were inserted . . . the words 'or which shall be made [.]' This insertion was meant to obviate all doubt concerning the force of treaties preexisting, by making the words 'all treaties made' to refer to them, as the words inserted would refer to future treaties." 2 FARRAND, supra note 115, at 389, 417 (Madison's notes). What was therefore crucial to clarifying the meaning of the clause with respect to the continued validity of preexisting treaties was the insertion of "or which shall be made" and not the use of "under the Authority of the United States," which appeared in both the unclear early version and in the final version. It may well be that Schwartz (who follows Justice Black in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957), on this point) is correct that the Supremacy Clause was not intended to give treaties an extra-constitutional status, but the evidence he adduces does not prove it. Professor Corwin fell into the same trap. See E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, at 421 n.17 (1957).
138. See SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER, supra note 74, at 141-65 passimn. In fact, Sutherland anticipated Holmes's argument in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), but with additional emphasis that such an argument is not tantamount to putting treaties above the Constitution. See SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 153-58.
139. Curtiss-Wright at 318. 140. Id.
meanings of "sovereignty" which Joseph Story had discussed.1 4 1 He also largely ignored the fact that the Constitution provides either an explicit or implicit, but still evident, authority for treaties and other international understandings and compacts. 142 A similar problem arises in his interpretation of the cases' 43 in which, he claimed, the Supreme Court had recognized that the United States Government held specific powers relating to foreign relations by virtue of its sovereign status under international law. These cases do state that the American nation possesses the powers incident to any sovereign nation. They also suggest that those powers reside in the federal government (or the President) by virtue of constitutional grants. 44 Sutherland concluded his discussion about the nature of federal power in foreign affairs with a quotation from the then-recent case of Burnet v. Brooks. "As a nation with all the attributes of sovereignty," Chief Justice Hughes had argued, "the United States is vested with all the powers of government necessary to maintin an effective control of international relations.' 4 This case, considered alone, came closest to supporting Sutherland's thesis about an inherent federal foreign relations power. Hughes recognized only such limitations to federal authority in foreign affairs as were imposed by the Constitution. 46 But Burnet included no extended discussion of the point, comparable to that found in Fong Yue Ting; 147 and as authority for the statement quoted by Sutherland, 148 Hughes relied on Fong Yue Ting 49 and a concurring opinion in The Legal Tender Cases. 150 Justice Gray's opinion for the court in Fong Yue Ting had traced the federal foreign relations power to specific constitutional grants.
1 5 ' Justice Bradley's concurrence in The Legal Tender Cases had based the federal powers over war and foreign relations on specific grants and on the fact that the states were forbidden to enter the field. Bradley spoke of "inherent" powers, but he seems to have been referring to such powers as were regarded as necessary to a general government when the Constitution was adopted and thus were implicitly vested in the federal government by the Constitution.
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The federal foreign relations power now tottering on an extra-constitutional footing, Sutherland asserted that "participation in the exercise of the power is significantly limited."' 5 3 In its exercise the President was the key figure, having important roles in treaty-making and foreign negotiation generally. 154 Sutherland spoke of "the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations-a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of *ourse, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution."' 55 Sutherland supported this view with several pieces of historical evidence.
One item was John Marshall's statement in the House of Representatives that "[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations."' 5 0 " Since these words of Marshall have often been quoted, it is worthwhile to put them in context. At issue was whether President John Adams had acted properly in extraditing a British subject to England on a murder charge pursuant to the Jay Treaty of 1795. After the statement just quoted, Marshall continued:
Of consequence, the demand of a foreign nation can only be made on [the President].
He possesses the whole Executive power. He holds and directs the force of the nation. Of consequence, any act to be performed by the force of the nation is to be performed through him. He is charged to execute the laws. A treaty is declared to be law. He must then execute a treaty, where he, and he alone, possesses the means of executing it.
The treaty, which is a law, enjoins the performance of a particular object. The person who is to perform this object is marked out by the Constitution, since the person is named who conducts the foreign intercourse, and is to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. The means by which it is to be performed, the force of the nation, are in the hands of this person. Ought not this person to perform the object, although the particular mode of using the means has not been described? Congress, unquestionably, may prescribe the mode, and Congress may devolve on others the whole execution of the contract; but, till this be done, it seems the duty of the Executive department to execute the contract by any means it possesses.
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Marshall, in other words, was claiming that the President's power could range from ministerial to discretionary, depending on what Congress had or had not done. It it difficult to extract from Marshall's comments an endorsement of unlimited executive discretion in foreign policy-making.
Another purported piece of evidence was an 1816 report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on instructing the President concerning a commercial treaty with Great Britain."" 8 Stressing that the President was "the constitutional representative with regard to foreign nations," the Committee held that Senate interference threatened the design, secrecy and dispatch necessary for successful negotiations and hence would impair national security. 0 0 Taken as a whole, however, the Report included a mixture of grounds for not instructing the President. For one thing, the President already knew the Senate's sentiments on the subject. 0 0 For another, the proposed Senate resolutions only duplicated past diplomatic instructions. 6 1 Further, the Report justified the Senate's noninvolvement in the negotiation process by noting "that if any benefits be derived from the division of the legislature into two bodies, the more separate and distinct in practice the negotiating and treaty ratifying [sic] powers are kept, the more safe the national interests."' 0 2 The Committee thereby praised the require- ment of independent Senate approval. Surely this indicated a conclusion that if the President had any independent authority, it extended only to the process of negotiation. Even the portion of the Report quoted by Sutherland affirmed that the President, in his conduct of foreign relations, "is responsible to the Constitution."' 0 3 The Committee implicitly asserted that, pursuant to the Constitution, the Senate could instruct the President: instruction was simply unwise on prudential grounds.' 64 (On other occasions, in fact, the Senate did advise on treaties, independently of consenting to them.) 1 0
In 1796 the House of Representatives requested that it be given documents relating to the Jay Treaty before it appropriated funds for implementing the Treaty. Sutherland approvingly quoted', 0 President Washington's denial of the request, a denial which echoed the claim in Federalist No. 64 that sharing information with the House might compromise the secrecy requisite to successful negotiations. 167 But again, this "evidence" on balance detracts from the Justice's position. Washington's reply turns out as a claim not for independent presidential authority, but for the independence of the treaty-making power -that is, the President and the Senate. Washington not only did not view his foreign relations power as resting on an extra-constitutional base, but he specifically linked it to the Constitution and the intentions of its framers and adopters. 168 When Sutherland commented that "the wisdom of [Washington's refusal to provide information to the House] was recognized by the House itself and has never since been doubted,"' 69 he was wrong. The House debate which followed Washington's response showed the President had not convinced some members. Resolutions reaffirming the House's position passed by a 57-to-35 margin. 170 The congressional practice of requesting the State Department to furnish information "if not incompatible with the public interest," while directing other Departments to do so, claimed Sutherland, evidenced recognition of " [t] he marked difference between foreign affairs and domestic affairs .... 1 ,7 3 The uncertainties attending foreign situations, plus the need sometimes to condition congressionally-authorized presidential action in foreign affairs on confidential information, further indicated "the unwisdom of requiring Congress in this field of governmental power to lay down narrowly definite standards by which the President is to be governed."' 74 These remarks, however, took Sutherland from an exposition of the original theory of the Constitution -that is, from first principles, which might admittedly be disclosed by early practice-to general practice and considerations of prudence. Yet, if general practice controlled the issue, his entire exposition of first principles was unnecessary. If prudence argued for imposing looser standards on foreign affairs delegation, then the issue was delegation and not independent presidential authority. Sutherland's overall point seems precisely to have been that it was the extra-constitutional nature of federal power in foreign affairs which allowed prudential considerations to override normal limitations on such power. The ultimate question must be whether the Justice had already succeeded in demonstrating the extra-constitutional nature of federal power in foreign affairs.
Undaunted, Sutherland closed his exposition of constitutional historical premises by quoting from Mackenzie v. Hare: "As a government, the United States is invested with all the attributes of sovereignty. As it has the character of nationality it has the powers of nationality, especially those which concern its relations and intercourse with other countries. 184 There remains another sort of historical judgment to render on Curtiss-Wright. The decision has had, and may continue to have, importance within particular legal and political controversies. By being available as authoritative precedent, it decreases the need to confront directly certain basic constitutional issues. As described at the beginning of the article, 185 the decision has in fact been used to support several propositions pertaining to the Constitution and foreign affairs. Whether it actually supports these propositions can now be assessed. 18 6 That the United States possesses all the powers of a sovereign nation is undoubtedly correct. That the federal government thereby inherently holds these powers or holds them at all does not automatically follow. Far from supporting the contention that external sovereignty devolved on the federal government ultimately from Great Britain and hence has an extra-constitutional base, Sutherland's historical evidence and judicial precedents suggest the opposite: Federal power in foreign affairs rests on explicit and implicit constitutional grants and derives from the ordinary constitutive authority. Whether Americans in 1787-1788 and earlier regarded this authority as resting with the states or with the people of the United States is not entirely clear, for there was no universally accepted view of the matter. Neither alternative provides an extra-constitutional base for the foreign relations power. One need not rely on Curtiss-Wright to limit state participation in foreign affairs: the Constitution imposes severe limitations. 1 8 7 Congressional authority finds similar explicit and implicit bases in the Constitution. Sutherland himself admitted that federal power in foreign relations was limited by specific prohibitions in the Constitution.
Sutherland uncovered no constitutional ground for upholding a broad, inherent, and independent presidential power in foreign relations. So, since an extra-constitutional base for the general foreign affairs power is also missing, no basis exists for concluding that the Constitution's allocation of foreign relations power between the branches may be constitutionally ignored. This is not to say that a clear allocation emerges from the Constitution or that any concrete understanding respecting allocation in the field of foreign affairs existed in 1787-1788. However, from both Sutherland's evidence and from other sources, hints of an implicit understanding do emerge. Americans of that day probably accorded Congress a coordinate, if not a dominant, role in the initiation of war, whether declared or not. 8 8 Control of commercial policy was largely assigned to Congress, 8 9 and contemporaries thought that commercial relations would constitute a major portion of America's overall relations with the world.' 90 Treaty-making involved both the President and the Senate; some Americans in 1787-1788 may have thought that the House would also have an input into treaty-making. John Marshall, at least in 1800, evidently did not believe that because the President was the sole organ of communication and negotiation with other nations, he became the sole foreign policymaker. Marshall indicated that Congress could modify the President's However, besides making a claim which is quite narrow on its face, Hamilton in context is not defending the President against Congress. His purpose, instead, is to defend the executive office as established by the Constitution against antifederalist arguments for a plural Executive. See id. passim.
189. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 191 Sutherland said little that bears on the question of executive privilege vis-h-vis Congress. Certainly the evidence he reviewed gives no support to claims that the Executive has an inherent power to maintain the confidentiality of information in its possession. Sutherland adduced no evidence, other than practice, that restrictions imposed by the Constitution on delegation of legislative power do not apply equally to delegation involving both domestic and foreign affairs. His evidence, other than practice, 102 leads to precisely the opposite conclusion.
In view of the doctrinal climate of the mid-1930's respecting delegation and Sutherland's comments on the need to go beyond practice to constitutional principles, there is no basis for regarding as dictum Curtiss-Wright's contention that federal power involving foreign affairs rests on a different base than federal power in domestic affairs. Similarly, its contention about independent presidential power is not dictum. If practice does not conclusively establish the Constitution's meaning, advancing either or both of these contentions was not superfluous to upholding the validity of the Chaco arms embargo. Quite the contrary: These contentions are necessary elements in Sutherland's opinion.' 93 On its face, moreover, Curtiss-Wright arguably loosens restrictions on domestic delegation when such delegation is necessary to the conduct of foreign relations. 194 It contains grounds which obviate the need for senatorial approval of certain international agreements. It does not narrow Congress's power to declare war, for Sutherland recognized that specific constitutional provisions placed restrictions on 191 194. The resolution and presidential actions upheld in Curtiss-Wright placed restrictions on domestic activities, that is, on arms sales in the United States to foreign countries, in an effort to influence a foreign situation. the exercise of external powers, but otherwise it implicitly supports executive authority to use the armed forces in implementing foreign policy objectives.
If one not only accepts Sutherland's premise about the need to resort to first principles rather than practice in constitutional interpretation, but also tests the historical accuracy of Sutherland's evidence, CurlissWright does not support the existence of an extra-constitutional base for federal authority, broad independent executive authority, or laxness in standards governing delegation. It certainly invests the President with no sweeping and independent policy role. If, conversely, one casts aside the notion that first principles are controlling, then CurtissWright's comments about actual practice provide support for the proposition that delegation in foreign affairs need not be so strictly controlled as Sutherland himself probably thought domestic delegation should be. This, though, is not to say that the past practice reviewed in Curtiss-Wright or the legislation therein at issue involved delegation broader than the domestic delegation which has been upheld since 1936.
In sum, it is incorrect to dismiss major segments of Curtiss-WTright as dicta. But the history on which those segments rest is "shockingly inaccurate." 195 If good history is a requisite to good constitutional law, then Curtiss-Wright ought to be relegated to history. 
